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As the Greek economy continues on its downward trajectory, the policy debate has 
degenerated into a re-enactment of the neoclassics versus Keynesians controversy. 
Yet, the Greek crisis can be solved neither by more austerity and structural reforms 
nor by Keynesian reflation. The core problem lies in a form of integration that has 
systematically weakened the Greek economy while stabilizing a clientelistic mode 
of interest intermediation. In order to recover, Greece needs a substantial devalua-
tion plus an interventionist industrial policy. Yet, such a form of integration is not 
palatable to the North West European creditor countries, nor is it attractive to the 
Greek government as it would require a break with the clientelistic organization of 
political power while removing the scapegoat of the EU.
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1. Introduction 1
With its 10.7 million inhabitants and a GDP of 
€184 billion Greece is a minor economy in the 506 
million strong European Union (EU) with a com-
bined GDP of over €15132 billion. Yet, more than 
five years after the onset of the Eurocrisis, the EU 
is more removed than ever from a solution to the 
Greek predicament. After two economic adjust-
ment programs with of total value of €237.3 billion, 
a Greek state bankruptcy and exit from the Euro 
remains an acute possibility. Despite a “haircut” in 
2012, Greek public debt, which stood at €301 billion 
by the end of 2009, had increased to €317.1 billion 
by late 2014. Meanwhile the Greek economy con-
tinues on its downward trajectory with GDP having 
shrunk by 29 percent between the third quarter of 
2010 and the first quarter of 2015, implying a rise 
in the debt to GDP ratio from 126 percent to 176 
percent. At the same time, unemployment remains 
at record levels. Greek PPP per capita GDP, which 
stood at 97.2 percent of the EU average in 2009, has 
dropped to 72.8 percent in 2014. Economic crisis, 
moreover, brings political instability in its wake as 
extremist parties gain popularity and political rela-
tions between Greece and its northern EU partners, 
Germany in particular, seem irreparably damaged.
As the crisis drags on, the EU is increasingly di-
vided over the causes of the Greek malaise. For 
the North West European creditor countries the 
problem is of a political nature. A deeply clien-
telistic political system provided generous rents 
to a multitude of interest groups such that not only 
the dynamics of the Greek economy was stunted 
but public finances were set on an unsustainable 
course. Accordingly, the seemingly straightforward 
solution consists of austerity in combination with 
structural reforms that liberate the Greek econo-
my from the stranglehold of public interference.
For the current Greek government and a growing 
number of sympathizers in other South European 
countries, the root cause of the problem, instead, 
lies in the neo-liberal ideas that inform the condi-
tionality imposed on Greece by the EU, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European 
Central Bank (ECB). Austerity in this view is the 
main problem, as cutting public expenditure in a 
crisis will further depress aggregate demand (Krug-
man 2012; Stiglitz 2015). The EU, it would seem, 
is bent on repeating the mistakes of the Great De-
pression when stubborn austerity policies not only 
precipitated the worst economic crisis in recorded 
history, but swept in place authoritarian regimes 
in a significant number of countries (Crafts 2013; 
De Bromhead, Eichengreen & O'Rourke 2012; 
Eichengreen & Temin 2010; Krugman 2010)
The crisis, in short, has revived the debate be-
tween liberal and Keynesian approaches to eco-
nomic policy that, since the 1980s, had been 
considered concluded in favor of the former. 
The neo-liberal villain of an interventionist state 
shackling market forces is again pitted against the 
Keynesian villain of a state which has fallen prey 
to the dogma of self-healing markets and stub-
bornly ignores the rapidly mounting evidence of 
the disastrous economic, political and social con-
sequences of its policies. However, rather than 
resulting from a detailed analysis of the Greek 
case, such attribution of blame follows directly 
from the core assumptions of both models. Start-
ing from the assumption of market efficiency, ob-
served deficiencies by default must be attributed 
to political intervention. Conversely, on the as-
sumption that unstable markets can be stabilized 
by appropriate macroeconomic policies, the oc-
currence of prolonged crises must mean that gov-
ernments have fallen prey to erroneous doctrines.
Though this set-up makes for an enticing morality 
play, the analyses of both camps are economically 
and politically inadequate. The Greek story in es-
sence is one of a failed developmental state that, 
in the context of a deeply fragmented polity, came 
to employ its extensive micro and macroeco-
nomic policy toolbox to provide protection from 
competition and allocate favors to its clientele. 
The end of the unprecedented period of growth 
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in Europe in the 1970s together with a stronger ex-
posure to competition through EU membership 
since 1981 further increased economic pressures 
on what was an increasingly unsustainable growth 
model. Yet, the peculiar form of regional integra-
tion adopted in the EU enabled successive Greek 
governments to stabilize a debt-financed clientelis-
tic growth model, while the EU's crisis response 
since 2010 has precipitated an economic and social 
catastrophe. In other words, the Greek crisis is the 
outcome of three interrelated failures: government 
failure in the form of misguided developmentalism, 
market failures that promoted income divergence 
while allowing Greece to run up excessive debts in 
compensation, as well as a failure of EU governance.
As a result, both Greece and the EU have maneu-
vered themselves into a trap. Economically Greece 
would require a flexible currency, substantial debt 
restructuring and an industrial regeneration strategy, 
but the engrained structures of clientelistic policy in-
termediation, cemented by 35 years of EU member-
ship, suggest that such a policy of shedding the Euro 
straitjacket might be unviable. Conversely, the Greek 
case demonstrates the EU's continued inability to the 
devise an effective strategy. While the shortsighted 
adjustment programs, designed to primarily serve the 
interest of the creditor countries, have exacerbated 
the crisis, a form of differential integration designed 
with the recovery of the Greek economy in mind re-
mains anathema to the EU and the creditor countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 
two argues that neither the Troika program of aus-
terity cum structural adjustment nor Keynesian re-
flation can provide a solution to the Greek crisis. 
Instead only a substantial devaluation of a reintro-
duced Drachma together with debt restructuring can 
provide the much needed growth stimulus, while a 
vertical industrial policy will be required to allow 
Greece to embark on a sustainable growth model.
Section three argues that the lack of an effective cri-
sis response by the EU is primarily inspired by the 
desire of the core EU countries to preserve a model 
of integration that has served them well, but at the 
price of economic instability in the periphery. Sec-
tion four, argues that, in view of the dysfunction-
alities of the Greek state a strategy of devaluation 
and industrial regeneration would ideally need 
to be assisted by the EU. Section five concludes.
2. Déjà Vu, Austerity versus Reflation
The common trigger that led five Eurozone countries 
to request assistance from the EU/IMF was a classic 
sudden stop in which a prolonged period of rising 
foreign indebtedness was followed by a loss of con-
fidence on the part of international financial markets 
with the resulting inability to roll over debt (Lane 
2012). Nevertheless, Greece holds a peculiar posi-
tion amongst these five program countries. Table 1 
depicts current account and budget deficits since the 
introduction of the Euro. In Spain, Ireland and Cy-
prus, the boom conditions sparked by the Euro and 
the single market in financial services had produced 
budget surpluses by 2007 such that mounting foreign 
debt largely resulted from dis-saving in the private 
sector. In Spain and Ireland, in particular, capital in-
flows, largely from North West European countries, 
provided the fuel with which local banks stoked a 
real-estate boom. Though also the Greek private 
sector recorded permanent deficits between 1998 
and 2008, the main contribution to the rising debt 
did come from the public sector. Accordingly, the 
adjustment program prescribed by the Troika would 
seem to directly address the causes of the problem.
In terms of public revenues and expenditures, the aus-
terity program booked impressive results. By means 
of higher taxes and a reduced incidence of tax eva-
sion total government revenues rose from 38.7 per-
cent of GDP to 45.6 percent by 2014. If anything, the 
turnaround in expenditures was even more impres-
sive. Between 2009 and 2014 general government 
expenditure dropped by over 31 percent from €128.3 
billion (54.0 percent of GDP) to €88.4 billion (49.3 
percent of GDP). Nevertheless, the program spec-
tacularly failed to reach its goal of reducing public 
indebtedness as deficits and public debt rose in ab-
solute terms and even more dramatically so relative 
to GDP. Even the Private Sector Involvement (PSI) 
program of late 2012, in which some creditors ac-
cepted a 50 percent cut in the nominal value of their 
debt, only managed to make a temporary dent in a 
rising trend such that the debt to GDP ratio increased 
from 126 percent in 2009 to 176 percent in 2014.2
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Part of this failure can be accounted for by the fact 
that fiscal multipliers proved much larger than ex-
pected (Blanchard & Leigh 2012). Yet the main 
problem lies in the failure of the adjustment program 
to provide for a stimulus to counteract the contrac-
tionary effects of austerity (Gros et al 2014). The 
architects of the Greek program had expected such 
stimuli to arrive via two avenues. First, in a Ricard-
ian framework public spending cuts can have ex-
pansionary effects as they signal future tax cuts to 
consumers and business, while a shift in financing 
the deficit from borrowing to taxation is neutral as 
it merely replaces future taxation with current one 
(ECB 2010 84-86, Trichet 2010B). As, the then 
President of the ECB Jean Claude Trichet (2010A) 
remarked in July of 2010: “Economies embarking 
on austerity policies that lend credibility to their 
fiscal policy strengthen confidence, growth and job 
creation.” Secondly, confidence would be stimu-
lated by structural reforms that reduce government 
intervention and give more play to market forces. 
Of prime importance here were wage cuts and im-
proved labor market flexibility as well as the reduc-
tion of red tape and the opening up to market forces 
of the many protected professions such as pharma-
cists, taxi drivers, road haulage and ferry services.
However, by now the Troika has also buried the be-
lief in the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. Due to 
its restrictive assumptions, such as the dominance 
of Ricardian consumers, infinitely lived individuals 
and the absence of liquidity constraints, the model 
is of little use outside of textbooks. Indeed, empiri-
cal examination of cases of expansionary auster-
ity have generally found that expenditure switching 
effects such as devaluations, strong international 
growth or cheap money policies, accounted for suc-
cess (IMF 2010). Ironically, by late 2014 empirical 
research by the ECB itself pointed in a similar di-
rection as it concluded that “[fiscal] consolidations, 
and in particular their unanticipated components af-
fect confidence negatively.” (Beetsma et al 2015).
Nor has the structural reform program provided the 
much-needed stimulus. Structural reforms essen-
tially focus on reducing wage costs and productivity 
by increasing labor and product market flexibility. 
Though they met with at times fierce resistance, here 
the overall outcomes have also been impressive. Ac-
cording to the OECD’s reform responsiveness index, 
which measures reform activity in a host of growth-
promoting areas such as labor costs, labor market reg-
ulation, scope of state intervention and barriers to en-
trepreneurship, Greece performed best of all OECD 
countries in the period 2007-14 (OECD 2015: 109).
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This lack of correlation between micro-economic 
reforms and growth points to two further weak-
nesses in the adjustment programs. First, expecting 
a boost to (macroeconomic) growth from microeco-
nomic reforms generally involves a fallacy of com-
position.3 Efficiency improving reforms will reduce 
the costs of the goods and services produced by a 
firm and thus may increase output, but to the extent 
that all competitors experience the same reduction 
there is no a priori reason to expect an overall in-
crease in output. Similarly, a reduction in labor cost 
can only be expected to improve a firm’s overall out-
put to the extent that competitors do not enjoy the 
same advantage. Growth impulses from structural 
reforms may thus reasonably be expected only to 
the extent that external competitiveness improves. 
Although unit labor cost have been substantially 
reduced since the onset of the crisis, as the OECD 
(2015: 46) notes: “this decline remains small rela-
tive to the increase that, in the pre-crisis period, led 
to large losses of competitiveness in these [Greece, 
Portugal, Spain] and other Euro area countries.”
Secondly, the attempt to improve external competi-
tiveness through internal devaluation increasingly 
undermines growth impulses as it provokes defla-
tion. Since Knut Wicksell (1898), it is well known 
that a persistent fall in the price level is apt to pro-
mote a cumulative process that will destroy the fi-
nancial system and the rest of the economy with it. 
Deflation implies a growing real debt burden and 
thus a higher rate of nonperforming loans, which will 
generally induce banks to tighten credit rationing. At 
a time when the value of money is rising in terms 
of goods and services, hoarding instead of consump-
tion and investment is the more appropriate strategy 
for individual actors so that the demand for credit 
also collapses. Indeed, in Greece the consumer price 
index has fallen in every month since March 2013, 
while the share of non-performing loans is increas-
ing steadily from 9.1 percent of total gross loans in 
2010 to 33.5 percent in 2014.4 To stem deflation, 
the ECB has resorted to the unconventional mea-
sure of quantitative easing 5 since September 2014. 
Yet, as Keynes (1936, Ch. 19) already pointed out, 
the nominal wage rather than the volume of mon-
ey is the anchor of the price system. Indeed, ECB 
president Mario Draghi seems to have recognized as 
much when he explained in May of 2015 that “there 
were strong signs that the [downward] trend [of the 
price level] was being driven by weak aggregate de-
mand. This was visible both at the macro level in a 
still wide output gap and a declining rate of core in-
flation; and at the micro level in subdued negotiated 
wages and low pricing power among firms.” (Draghi 
2015, emphasis in the original). Nevertheless, the 
Troika continues to insist on labor market flexi-
bilization thus de facto engaging in what increas-
ingly is a contradictory and self-defeating strategy.
Though the austerity program has aggravated the 
crisis, a Keynesian fiscal stimulus would be equally 
inappropriate. The Keynesian justification for coun-
tercyclical fiscal spending ultimately rests on the 
anthropological constant of animal spirits such that 
public deficits or surpluses can stabilize GDP by 
compensating for the swings in investment spending 
driven by fickle expectations. But what precipitated 
the Greek crisis was not an exogenous downturn of in-
vestment activity but the inability to further finance a 
burgeoning public debt that had resulted from almost 
permanent deficit spending since the end of the mili-
tary regime. Budget deficits in Greece did not function 
as a compensation for swings in investment activity 
but instead became the main engine of growth in an 
economy marked by an increasingly uncompetitive 
private sector and anemic private investment activity.
Since the start of a hard Drachma policy in the 
1990s, Greece has almost permanently suffered real 
appreciation versus North Western Europe and in 
particularity Germany. Moreover, due to the Eastern 
enlargement of the EU and competition from emerg-
ing economies such as China, the low to mid-tech 
Greek manufacturing sector (Simonazzi et al 2013) 
has found it increasingly difficult to export, while 
five years of a shrinking economy have greatly ac-
celerated the process of de-industrialization. Though 
Keynesian reflation might serve to stabilize con-
sumption and thus mitigate some of the social hard-
ships, in the current situation it will do more to 
stimulate imports than promote domestic output. But 
even if reflation should create incentives to invest, 
the state of the current Greek banking system makes 
it unlikely that sufficient investment finance will 
be forthcoming. With a still substantial exposure to 
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Greek sovereign debt, roughly one third of the loan 
portfolio non-performing, and a continuous hemor-
rhaging of funds as depositors seek to protect them-
selves from a possible Grexit, the only thing that pro-
tects the Greek banking system from collapse is the 
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of the ECB.
With both internal devaluation and reflation counter-
productive, the urgently needed impulse to the Greek 
economy must come from an (external) devaluation 
of a reintroduced Drachma. Devaluation could im-
mediately redress the loss of competitiveness Greece 
has suffered since the 1990s. Moreover, devaluation 
will impart an inflationary impulse to the economy 
which is highly desirable in the current context of 
deflation. Finally it would serve to repatriate many of 
the funds that are currently leaving the Greek banking 
system in fear of a possible Grexit. However, as its 
debt is nominated in Euro, a devaluation would make 
the debt burden even more unsustainable, such that 
a debt moratorium and substantial debt restructuring 
would be called for. Finally, due to their exposure to 
sovereign debt, debt restructuring may make a recapi-
talization of the Greek banking system necessary, just 
as occurred in the wake of the PSI of October 2012.
The example of Iceland, whose (private) debt 
far exceeded that of Greece, testifies to the vi-
ability of such a strategy (Wade & Sigurgeirsdottir 
2012). Though by no means painless, the Icelan-
dic strategy of default and devaluation has proven 
much less costly in terms of output and unemploy-
ment than the policies in any of the five EU coun-
tries that were subjected to adjustment programs, 
so that even the IMF (2012) argues that Iceland 
may hold valuable lessons for other countries.
However, even though devaluation may restart 
growth, this is a low wage strategy that works by im-
poverishing the country and as such further reinforc-
es the trend towards per capita income divergence 
in the EU. Given that Greece’s manufacturing base 
has continuously weakened since 1981, establishing 
a sustainable growth model in Greece will require 
that the macroeconomic strategy of a flexible ex-
change rate be accompanied by industrial policies.
                                                     
As the next section will argue, currently there 
would seem to be insurmountable political difficul-
ties to such a strategy as neither the EU would allow 
such a reorientation nor would the Greek state have 
the required capabilities to pursue such policies
3. The failure of EU Economic Governance
As democratic contestation is much suppressed 
in the EU (Mair 2013) due to its technocratic set-
up and the institutional incentives of the EP to in-
crease its own role, the legitimacy of the EU, more 
so than its member states, rests on policy output. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Eurocrisis has en-
gendered a radical rise in integration-critical sen-
timents. Eurobarometer surveys indicate that 
since late 2011 50 percent or more of Europeans 
tend not to trust the EU (Figure 1). Of equal im-
portance is the rapid rise of Eurosceptic parties, 
especially in traditionally Euro-friendly coun-
tries such as the Netherlands, Finland, France and 
Italy. After five years of failing to come to terms 
with the problems of tiny Greece, the puzzle be-
comes why the EU doggedly persists in its origi-
nal course? Why is the EU risking a major political
crisis that may sound its death knell rather than to 
adjust its policies?
In essence, the failure of EU economic governance 
to resolve the crisis centers on the interest of the 
North-Western creditor countries in what largely 
has come to be interpreted as a zero-sum interna-
tional environment. By resisting any substantial 
debt restructuring and the introduction of a resolu-
tion mechanism for sovereign debt, the EU creditor 
countries have managed to turn what would have 
been a problem of the domestic financial sector into 
an issue of political mismanagement in Greece. By 
refusing to contemplate a Grexit the creditor coun-
tries are defending the export-oriented growth mod-
el that has ensured their political cohesion since the 
1980s. Moreover, in a world in which international 
competitiveness is seen as the key to economic 
success any form of differential integration to the 
benefit of less developed member states necessarily
becomes interpreted as a zero sum game.
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late 2010 each held Greek sovereign debt for a value 
of around €15 billion, this would have put part of the 
problem in the court of the creditor countries. Instead, 
the EU/IMF loan facilities allowed the banks to divest 
themselves of these investments 6 so that in early 2015 
the exposure to Greek sovereign debt is estimated to 
have been drastically reduced to around €181 million 
for German banks and €102 million for France (Dor 
2015). Indeed, the IMF seemed initially predisposed 
to debt restructuring as, according to its rules, Greek 
debt was unsustainable which precluded a standby 
program. Yet this position met with fierce resistance 
from the EU, eventually leading the IMF to flout its 
own rules 7 by participating in the first package (Blus-
tein 2015). Moreover, in the 1990s the IMF had al-
ready proposed a (global) orderly restructuring mech-
anism for sovereign debt, and has reissued this call in 
2013 (IMF 2013) but failed to get approval up to now.
The Troika’s solution thus not only deflected atten-
tion away from shortcomings on the lender side; it 
also substituted private holding of Greek debt with 
substantial public holdings by the EU and the ECB 
such that any future Greek debt restructuring would 
now incur direct losses for taxpayers. In short by 
refusing to contemplate any lender responsibility 
and trying to recover the full amount through im-
Though generally framed as a sovereign debt crisis, 
the Eurocrisis might just as easily be labelled the sec-
ond banking crisis of the 21st century. After all, the 
origins of the crisis in Cyprus, Ireland and Spain are 
very similar to the excessive risk-taking by financial 
institutions that precipitated the U.S. sub-prime cri-
sis. Only in Greece would the epithet sovereign debt 
crisis seem justified. Yet, it takes both a debtor and 
a creditor to create debt. Though residents, held the 
largest share of Greek sovereign debt, in 2011 about 
38.5 percent, amounting to roughly €70 billion, was 
held be non-residents (excluding the ECB) (Merler 
& Pisany-Ferry 2012). Since the state of Greek pub-
lic finances and the quality of governance were not 
unknown, it can reasonably be argued that those in-
stitutions that invested large sums in Greek sovereign 
debt failed to perform an adequate creditworthiness 
appraisal. Indeed, as Abelshauser (2010: 45) shows, 
major investors, meeting in Berlin in April 2009, were 
well aware of the high risk involved but counted on a 
public bailout in case problems should arise. Had the 
crisis been labelled a banking crisis, Greece’s inabil-
ity to roll over its debt in the spring of 2010 would 
have implied a write down of the value of Greek sov-
ereign bonds, so that losses would have accrued on the 
lender side. Since both German and French banks in 
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cantilist models of political economy that have come 
to characterize Germany and its neighbors (Bonatti & 
Fracasso 2013: Notermans 2012). Due to its high ca-
pacity for wage moderation, the Euro implied a con-
tinuous real depreciation for Germany which greatly 
contributed to its growing current account surpluses. 
Secondly, Euro membership provided a way out of 
the contradiction involved in a strategy of tight mon-
ey and current account surpluses. Such a strategy is 
vulnerable to market forces that would tend to make 
such currencies appreciation candidates thus forcing 
a choice between either dear money or a current ac-
count surplus.8  Moreover, as the forceful apprecia-
tion of the Japanese Yen in the 1980s showed, such 
a strategy was also vulnerable to political pressures 
from the main deficit country, the USA. The com-
mon currency instead managed to deflect these politi-
cal and market pressures by creating a larger block 
of countries with irrevocably fixed exchange rates.
Finally, industrial policies, the third essential element 
in solving the Greek crisis, equally stands little chance 
of being implemented as it is not in the interest of the 
core countries. Its own history teaches Western Eu-
rope that industrial policy can make a potent contri-
bution to economic development. Economies such as 
France, Finland and Italy, which had an acute sense 
of economic backwardness after 1945, generally had 
recourse to industrial policies aimed at creating na-
tional champions, not unlike the developmental strat-
egy pursued in many east asian countries (Breznitz 
2007; Jäntti & Juhana Vartiainen 200; Kim 2004; 
Kohli 2004). As a result, barriers to trade remained 
numerous not only within Western Europe but also 
between Western Europe and the USA. However, 
since the 1980s the EU gradually outlawed such poli-
cies. During the 1980s, the EU acquired an effective 
competence in competition policy, with increasingly 
strict rules on state aid, while the Single European 
Act (SEA) of 1986 dismantled the overwhelming 
part of non-tariff barriers. With the spectacular catch 
up staged in the first three decades after the war 
completed, such policies not only seemed no longer 
necessary, they also created the risk of sparking self-
defeating subsidy races. More importantly, allowing 
peripheral countries access to such policies implies a 
form of differential integration that imposes limits to 
the market access of the more advanced countries. In
posed fiscal austerity, creditor countries did avoid 
further politically highly unpopular bank bailouts 
but at the price of multiplying the costs of resolv-
ing the crisis and unnecessarily exacerbating ten-
sions between creditor and debtor countries. As a 
result, they have created a climate in which Euros-
ceptic parties in Northern Europe were given an op-
portunity to fan further resentments by harking on 
the theme of the alleged South European “PIGS”.
Secondly, International economic arrangements gen-
erally contain escape clauses that may be activated 
in case of unforeseen hardships. The WTO, for ex-
ample, allows for temporary suspension of conces-
sions if domestic companies are hurt much more 
than initially expected. Similarly, in the monetary 
field Bordo & Kydland (1999), have interpreted the 
pre-1914 Gold Standard as a contingent commit-
ment mechanism which owed its stability in part to 
the fact that it allowed countries to temporarily exit 
in case of unforeseen circumstances without losing 
the policy credibility the arrangement bestowed. 
The common currency did not include any of such 
clauses on the argument that contingent commit-
ment was impossible due to moral hazard. One of 
the main goals of the common currency was to ex-
tend the rigid nominal framework of the Bundes-
bank to the rest of Europe. If escape clauses were 
included, so it was felt, this would both undermine 
the incentives of wage bargainers and fiscal authori-
ties to limit their claims to what was compatible with 
the low inflation target. Yet, such clauses might have 
been introduced afterwards, in particular once the 
originally unexpected continuous real appreciation 
of peripheral countries had become apparent. Af-
ter all, after the no-bail out clause of the Maastricht 
treaty, which was considered a core pillar of the com-
mon currency, was revoked in the spring of 2010.
Allowing Greece a temporary exit from the Euro so 
as to gain time to put its house in order was never 
even contemplated by the creditor countries. In part 
this may have been due to the desire to prevent a 
loss of face if serious adjustments had to be made 
to the EU’s flagship project. In part it also reflected 
the unwillingness to dent a project that was to have 
increased Europe’s global standing by creating a 
currency that could challenge the U.S. Dollar. More 
important was the fact that the Euro played, and con-
tinuous to play a crucial role in stabilizing the mer-
24
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deed Jacoby (2010) has aptly characterized the EU’s 
approach to its latest and poorest members in Eastern 
Europe as a strategy of maximizing the opportunities 
and minimizing the threats; maximizing the contribu-
tion to the competitiveness of West European com-
panies by integrating Eastern Europe as low wage 
producers in production chains, while minimizing 
the risk of the emergence of serious competitors.9
What came to replace industrial policies in the en-
larged Europe were cohesion policies. Cohesion pol-
icies can be interpreted in two different ways (Leon-
ardi & Hoguin 2015). One way is to view them as 
transfers that compensate poorer member states for 
the negative economic effects of integration thereby 
allowing for an increased standard of living notwith-
standing a weakening of their economies. The other is 
as a tool designed to make the productive capacity of 
these economies converge with the richer countries. 
Irrespective of what the intention of policy mak-
ers may have been, due to its horizontal orientation 
which focuses on upgrading infrastructure, educa-
tion and employability and assumes that such public 
goods will automatically give rise to the advanced
industries that require them, the first interpretation is 
the more accurate one (Notermans 2015). As figure 2 
shows, after joining the EU in 1981 a long period of 
income convergence abruptly gave way to divergence 
in Greece, which was only halted when the prospect 
of ERM and Euro-membership allowed for the debt-
financed boom. By 2014 Greece’s relative income 
position is back to where it was in the latter half of the 
1960s. Having been one of the main beneficiaries of 
EU cohesion spending, the Greek case suggests the 
same conclusion the World Bank is reaching on de-
velopmental policies, namely that the combination of 
open markets  and horizontal development aid is not 
an effective recipe for convergence 10 but that instead 
stepwise liberalization and interventionist industrial 
policies are of the essence. (Lin 2009; Stiglitz & 
Lin 2013; Wade 2012).
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4. Can Greece Survive Outside the Euro?
If a recovery of the Greek economy is indeed ob-
structed by Euro membership, the question arises 
why no government since 2010 has shown any in-
tention of leaving. Indeed, even the Syriza govern-
ment of Alexis Tsipras, which was elected on the 
platform of putting an end to Troika interference, 
adamantly excluded this option and instead placed 
its hope on being able to pressure the EU and IMF 
into debt restructuring and less onerous condition-
ality. Moreover, in October 2014 59 percent of the 
Greeks surveyed still responded that having the Euro 
was a good thing for their country.11 
Even though the reintroduction of a national curren-
cy would give Greece the leeway to pursue a more 
effective recovery strategy, such skepticism towards 
national monetary autonomy rests on good grounds 
as it is by no means clear that the government pos-
sesses the capability and autonomy to successfully 
implement such policies. Though EU and Euro 
membership may have weakened the Greek econ-
omy, they became essential for stabilizing a highly 
clientelistic from of policy making based on the dis-
tribution of rents by the state. Policies of exchange 
rate flexibility in combination with industrial regen-
eration, in order to be pursued successfully, however, 
require a broad societal consensus on the distribution 
of income and a strict adherence to performance cri-
teria; something the Greek polity has not been able to 
establish up to now (Featherstone2011; Karagiannis 
& Kondeas 2012). With little or no rents to distribute 
and the scapegoat of the Troika as well as the ex-
ternal constraint of the Euro removed, Greece may 
prove even less able to pursue effective economic 
policies than it has been hitherto.
In Western Europe, the spectacular post-1945 recov-
ery was based on a broad societal consensus between 
the state, business and labor, in which the priority 
for economic growth was underpinned by a concern 
for distributional fairness. Claims on the national 
product were to be limited to what growth afforded 
while productivity oriented wage policies, taxation 
and the gradual expansion of the welfare state as-
sured that the fruits of growth were distributed fairly. 
Greece instead descended into a 4 year civil war in 
1945 while the authoritarian democracy established 
afterwards as well as the subsequent military regime 
excluded large sections of the left. The end of mili-
tary rule in 1974 might have been the occasion for 
such a consensus to be established. Though the new 
government legalized the Communist party and thus 
signaled its desire for an inclusive democracy, social 
consensus on the road to be taken proved beyond the 
ability of the Greek political system.
To some extent the timing was unlucky as the end 
of the military regime coincided with the end of the 
Trente Glorieuses so that increased expectations col-
lided with a diminished distributive space. The crucial 
weakness, however, resulted from the combination 
of polarization and fragmentation. Under a constella-
tion of two cohesive and well organized camps, such 
as e.g., in Austria after 1945, a corporatist consen-
sus along the lines of most west European countries 
after 1945 might have been feasible. However, the 
fragmentation of both business and labor meant that 
in effect no functional peak organization existed that 
could make a claim to comprehensive representa-
tion and would have had the ability to enforce coop-
eration, while the two main parties essentially were 
weak coalitions of a large number of diverse inter-
ests. In this constellation, the newly founded Social-
ist Party (PASOK) embarked on a populist strategy 
of mobilizing a large electoral following by means of 
distributing rents. Though its counterpart, the Con-
servative New Democracy (ND), initially was reluc-
tant to engage in similar tactics (Pappas 2014) elec-
toral considerations soon brought a change of mind.
Commonly such strategies should not be sustain-
able for long as the resulting current account and 
budget deficits will come to pose clear limits to the 
amount of public and or private debt that that can 
be financed. Astonishingly, the limits of that strategy 
were only met in 2009, i.e. roughly 35 years after its 
start, during which period a vicious circle of a weak-
ening economy and increasing reliance on the state 
for the distribution of rents was maintained.
With a very tightly controlled financial system the 
initial strategy consisted of forcing the domestic 
banking system to hold government debt and direct 
credit to ailing companies while keeping real interest 
rates negative. That not only saddled the banks with 
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an increasingly weak assets structure, it also created 
incentives for depositors to bypass the official finan-
cial channels. For deficit spending to remain sustain-
able, government debt had to be offered at market-
determined rates, which was indeed one of the main 
reasons behind the domestic and external financial 
liberalization in Greece since the mid-1980s. But, as 
interest rates rose, so did the debt service.
Given the mounting problems with financing debt 
through financial repression, monetization of debt 
through the central bank was increasingly employed 
in the 1970s and 1980s. But with debt largely used 
to finance government consumption and the surviv-
al of ailing firms, higher inflation instead of higher 
growth ensued. To prevent a rapid deterioration of 
the current account due to above average inflation 
rates, devaluations had to be resorted to but with the 
sum of the claims on the national product exceed-
ing 1, devaluation rather prepared the ground for 
more inflation as higher import prices were passed 
on into domestic wages and thus prices. A devaluing 
currency and high inflation in turn came to hinder 
the strategy of financing the debt through the mar-
ket. Not only did interest rate differentials increase, 
but rationing of credit and the eventual inability of 
Greece to issue debt in its own currency, as is typical 
of developing countries, would have resulted. The 
limits of the strategy seemed to have been reached 
in 1985 when the newly elected PASOK government 
needed to embark on a program of fiscal and mone-
tary consolidation, with the support of an EU balance 
of payments loan. Yet the consolidation program was 
abandoned after less than 2 years, due its negative 
impact on the electoral popularity of the ruling party. 
By the early 1990s, however a watershed seemed to 
have been reached. Rampant inflation and escalating 
budget and current account deficits convinced both 
main parties that consolidation had become inevi-
table. Moreover, a broad consensus emerged that the 
road to economic stability lay in membership of the 
common currency. Supported by another EU balance 
of payments loan in 1991, both ND and PASOK gov-
ernments thus set out to reach the Maastricht con-
vergence criteria. Inflation decreased throughout the 
decade from a peak of over 20 percent in the 1990s, 
and so did the budget deficit. On January 1, 1999 
the Drachma entered the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) and two years later Greece joined the com-
mon currency. Towards the end of the decade growth 
rates also started to pick up such that Greece came 
to record one of the highest GDP growth rates in the 
EU for the 1999-2009 period. Indeed, to several ob-
servers Greece finally seemed to be overcoming the 
problems of dysfunctional economic policies (Pa-
goulatos 2003:128-9; Vamvakidis 2003,).
Yet, as we know now, this success largely was a chi-
mera. The hard Drachma policy aimed at bringing 
down inflation set in motion a process of real appre-
ciation that further weakened the economic structure 
of Greece. Unemployment increased throughout the 
1990s and remained high afterwards, while the em-
ployment rate was amongst the lowest in the EU. The 
current account gradually worsened, and towards the 
end of the decade ERM and Euro membership re-
laxed the constraints on private and public indebted-
ness such that by 2009 Greece found itself with a 
higher stock of debt and a weaker economy than had 
been the case in the early 1990s. 
EU and Euro membership proved essential for Greece 
to postpone the day of reckoning. Two mechanisms 
were at work. First, EU, ERM and Eurozone mem-
bership improved the creditworthiness of Greece 
as it served to reduce jurisdictional risk in increas-
ingly liberated EU financial markets and eliminated 
exchange rate risk. Since ERM entry in 1999, capi-
tal inflows, especially from the North Western EU 
members that enjoyed large current account surplus-
es, rapidly increased, effectively eliminating con-
straints on the build-up of debt (Alogoskoufis 2012: 
12). Secondly, from the beginning Greece used the 
veto position EU membership awarded it to obtain 
major transfers. As a result, the country would be-
come the main recipient of structural and regional 
funds in per capita terms. By threatening to veto the 
accession of Spain and Portugal, a first major in-
crease in regional funds was obtained in the form of 
the Integrated Mediterranean Programs. The Greek 
signature under the Single European Act came at the 
price of a doubling of regional funds, while its ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht treaty required the creation 
of the Cohesion Fund. Since in practice the setting of 
priorities and the disbursement of funds largely re-
mains under the control of the member states, in the 
Greek case regional and structural spending rather 
served to compensate the Greek government for the 
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negative economic effects of the successive steps at 
deepening integration by increasing its rent distribut-
ing capacity (Saravelos 2007). As Euclid Tsakalatos 
p. 124: points out: “Indeed, all too much of the EU 
funds available for structural change, necessary for 
Greece’s integration with the EU, were used to shore 
up existing economic structures and to support the 
least competitive strata in society.”
As the 35 years of Greek EU membership have sta-
bilized a debt financed growth model in which the 
economy progressively weakened and the state came 
to occupy a central role in allocation, it cannot be 
taken for granted that the Greek state could success-
fully establish a new growth model based on indus-
trial upgrading and external competitiveness. Three 
issues come to mind. First, after devaluation and de-
fault Greece would be temporarily excluded from in-
ternational financial markets 12 and thus would not be 
able to finance new debt. The retreat of the state from 
its customary role, however, would not necessarily 
promote a larger reliance on market allocation but 
might just as easily lead to a crisis of legitimacy with 
the state progressively becoming unable to enforce 
its rules, a further expansion of corruption and the 
black economy, and in the extreme case a failed state 
scenario. Indeed many of the riots Greece has expe-
rience since 2009 were directed against the state as 
such and not against a particular government (Pappas 
2014: 79ff). Simultaneously, distrust of the govern-
ment, according to Eurobarometer data has gradually 
increased from 54 percent in November 2009 to 89 
percent in November 2014, and is currently the high-
est in the EU.
Secondly, a reintroduced Drachma might fail to gain 
the trust of financial markets. While Conservative 
and Liberal parties generally justified their support 
for the introduction of a common currency with the 
need to curtail the excessive intervention of leftist 
governments, the Left in turn argued that there was 
no alternative as the German Bundesbank dominated 
monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate while 
devaluation of the currency would undermine trust 
thus preparing the stage for a next devaluation. The 
emblematic case was the policy U-turn executed 
by French socialist president François Mitterrand 
in 1983. Though frequently interpreted as such, the 
French U-turn did not signal that there was no al-
ternative in macroeconomic policies. Rather it sig-
naled that such alternatives only existed to the ex-
tent that the political system was able to handle the 
trade-offs involved. In an environment where the 
major economies, Germany and the USA first of 
all, were pursuing tight money and fiscal austerity 
a policy of demand driven domestic reflation had to 
run into insurmountable balance of payments prob-
lems. Only if the wages cuts implied by devaluation 
were domestically acceptable could the autonomy 
that a flexible exchange rate awarded be enjoyed. If 
instead devaluation would set off a wage price spiral, 
there was indeed no alternative. Between 1975 and 
the hard Drachma policy of the 1990s Greece has 
had similar experiences with a soft currency policy 
(Featherstone 2008: 45ff). However, with unemploy-
ment currently around 25 percent and the price level 
falling, a threat of a wage price spiral would seem 
remote in the short-run and some inflation indeed 
would be highly desirable, though the traditionally 
radical public sector unions may pose a problem in 
this respect. 
Finally, the recent history of Greece does not give 
much reason for optimism concerning its ability to 
successfully run an industrial policy. In the frame-
work of a highly clientelistic polity, the import sub-
stitution policies pursued in Greece from the 1950s 
to the 1980s saddled the country with a substantial 
share of permanently uncompetitive industries that 
constituted a continuous drain on the budget mainly 
because clientelistic patterns of interest mediation 
made consistent enforcement of modernization tar-
gets illusory.
In sum, given the risks involved, substantial EU in-
volvement in a Greek recovery strategy might be es-
sential, though this would require a complete turn-
around of the current Troika approach, based on the 
recognition that restoring Greece to prosperity rather 
than recovering the debt should be the first priority. 
The ideal strategy would seem a combination of real 
convergence criteria tied to both structural policies 
and a return to the Euro in combination with the 
technical assistance the EU is already providing in 
creating a more efficient and effective bureaucracy. 
As the 1990s suggest, the only reasonable effective 
antidote against Greek clientelism is a combination 
of a severe economic crisis together with the pros-
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pect of an EU solution. During the 1990s, qualifying 
for Eurozone membership had become a matter of 
national pride as being left out would have been seen 
as recognition that Greece is a second-class member. 
Under this constellation both ND and PASOK gov-
ernments did manage to muster the political auton-
omy to reduce the budget deficit and inflation rates 
substantially. While the nominal convergence crite-
ria did much to further weaken the Greek economy 
and structural funds fueled clientelism, the strategy 
could be inverted. A return to the Euro, in this case 
would be tied to real convergence criteria in terms 
of per capita GDP, labor productivity unemployment 
and employment rates and current account balance. 
Structural policies instead would take its cue from 
the industrialization policies pursued with so much 
success in East Asian countries and would thus pri-
marily have a vertical orientation, while disburse-
ments would be tied to strict performance criteria 
such as export performance, production targets and 
new products.
5. Conclusion
Though the Eurozone crisis has reduced the two 
main Greek parties to insignificance, their succes-
sor in political power has not broken the traditional 
mold of Greek politics. The Syriza government un-
der Alexis Tsipras was elected on a platform of put-
ting an end to Troika interference and reversing some 
of the cuts in public employment and welfare ben-
efits, but completely lacked a program for reviving 
the Greek economy without Troika support. Undoing 
the foreign imposed austerity program, it was sug-
gested would solve most of Greece’s trouble while a 
discussion of necessary, but possibly unpopular re-
forms was conspicuously absent. 
A Grexit, which would have implied a wage cut 
and a reduction of the value of financial assets, was 
adamantly ruled out, and while funds were rapidly 
draining from the Greek financial system, the gov-
ernment refused to contemplate any restrictions on 
cross-border capital movements until the temporary 
breakdown of negotiations on June 27 made this in-
evitable. Tsipras’ strategy apparently rested entirely 
on confidence in his ability to browbeat the IMF and 
the other 18 Eurozone countries into concessions. 
The referendum on the Troika conditionality, held on 
July 5, was allegedly to strengthen the Greek’ gov-
ernment’s’ hand in the negotiations with its creditors. 
Simultaneously, the rapid deterioration of the eco-
nomic situation provoked by Tsipras’ confrontational 
strategy seemed intended to convince the creditors 
that a fundamental change of policy was in order. A 
cessation of the ECB’s ELA support and a possible 
state bankruptcy would interrupt the provision of es-
sential services and provoke a humanitarian crisis.
A credible Greek threat to exit from the Euro would 
have tested Germany’s willingness to go down in 
history as the executioner of the common currency as 
well as the EU’s readiness to say goodbye to its flag-
ship project. Without an alternative to the Euro, how-
ever Tsipras’ strategy could not but fail.13  The large 
majority against the reform program that emerged 
in the July 5 referendum did not imply a democratic 
majority for further concession in the creditor coun-
tries. Apart from undermining the credibility of the 
Eurozone countries, additional support to Greece 
while abandoning core points of the reform program 
would have met with fierce resistance from parlia-
ments in e.g. Germany and the Netherlands. Though 
the creditors did offer some concessions such as a 
lower primary surplus, 14 the main points of further 
tax increase and pension reform were not negotiable. 
Nor did Greece find any allies amongst the Eastern 
and Southern Eurozone countries. Eastern countries 
increasingly resented having to support a country 
with a substantially higher GDP that was apparently 
unwilling to implement the painful adjustment pro-
gram they themselves had undergone after the 2008 
crisis. Southern European governments under pres-
sure from populist and Eurosceptic parties at home 
had no interest in seeing Syriza succeed. 
Indeed, shortly after the July 5 referendum negotia-
tions resumed and on July 13, the Syriza government 
accepted a reform program that in some respects 
was even harsher than what had been on offer before 
June 27. The privatization program now was de facto 
place under foreign control as Greek assets were to 
be transferred to an independent fund, while Tsip-
ras also had to agree to “backtracking on previous 
programme commitments or identify clear compen-
satory equivalents for the vested rights that were sub-
sequently created” (Eurosummit 2015).
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In the end, the political crisis precipitated by the June 
27 Eurogroup decision to interrupt negotiations has 
served to cement a strategy that will benefit neither 
party. Alexis Tsipras’ may currently have strength-
ened his political position by demonstrating that de-
spite his resolve to stand up to the creditors no mean-
ingful changed to the current reform program can be 
gained, but the apparent lack of a political alternative 
is likely to promote political apathy and cynicism 
and possible support for the neo-fascist alternative of 
the Golden Dawn.
Nor can the EU be confident that the crisis is over. As 
repeated ad nauseam by the avalanche of documents 
the many EU processes and strategies produce, pro-
moting economic prosperity and social inclusion is 
amongst the principal objectives of European integra-
tion, but for the Brussels institutions, an ever-closer 
union has long become an end instead of a means. 
Greece was accepted into the EU and the Euro at a 
point when it was manifestly not ready and the nega-
tive consequences of those decisions, which had been 
in clear view from the beginning, were generally ig-
nored in favor of self-congratulatory messages about 
the success of yet another step in deepening integra-
tion. Similarly, the North Western creditor countries 
have adamantly refused to make any design change 
in a model of integration that has served them well 
but increasingly is condemning not only Greece but 
many other peripheral EU countries to a permanent 
future as the poor cousins of the family. Unlike many 
other international economic arrangements, the idea 
of escape clauses to be activated in case of unfore-
seen consequences is utterly alien to the EU. Though 
this insistence on the irreversibility of any further in-
tegration step undertaken was hoped to cement the 
gains of European integration, it has evolved into the 
major threat to integration. Unable to live up to its 
promises and unwilling to take into account the dif-
ferential needs of its members, European Integration 
has more than ever has become an elite project.
At the end of the Second World War the U.S. hoped 
to replace the manifold barriers in the crisis prone 
pre 1940 world economy with a liberal system to the 
benefit of all. But the U.S. administration never lost 
sight of the fact that integration was a means to pros-
perity and not an end. When it became clear that the 
ravaged west European economies would not be able 
to stand up to U.S. competition for a considerable 
time, the plan was dumped in favor of a system in 
which West European government were allowed to 
actively discriminate against the USA, encouraged 
to employ the toolbox of an interventionist state to 
promote recovery while receiving substantial Mar-
shall aid to eliminate the initial bottlenecks. The EU 
instead seems to have lost sight of the fact that its 
main objective must be the recovery of the Greek 
economy and that the means must be subjected to 
this end. Indeed, the strategy of the creditor coun-
tries in the Greek tragedy frequently is more remi-
niscent of Clemenceau’ position in Versailles where 
the overriding purpose was to punish Germany for 
its misdeeds rather than to steer it on a course to eco-
nomic prosperity, stability and democracy. Irrespec-
tive of whether Greece will remain in Europe or not, 
for its own sake the EU cannot ignore the problem 
of a failing economy and state within its geographic 
borders, and thus eventually will need to address the 
question of how to bring about economic recovery. 
The blueprint for such a policy it can find it the post 
1945 recovery of Western Europe. 
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endnotes
1. This paper was written during a stay as visiting professor at the European Union Center of Pusan 
National University. Many thanks to the Center’s director, Kim Dong-Jin, as well as Nam Sang-Hoon, 
Won Yoo-Kyung and Richard Shannon for their help and hospitality.
2. Source of all data: AMECO.
3. It is no coincidence that the global turn to so-called neo-liberal policies that rested on a restrictive 
macroeconomic framework in combination with structural reforms have ushered in a period of per-
manently lower growth.
4. Source: World Bank.
5. Purchase by the ECB of asset backed securities, covered bonds and public sector securities.
6. In addition, the German public financial institution FMSW ended up with a substantial holding of 
Greek sovereign debt after taking over the assets of the failed Hypo Real Estate and its German-Irish 
subsidiary Deutsche Pfandbriefbank (DEPFA).  
 
7. Diplomatically called the systemic exception by the IMF.
8. Indeed, Germany’s policy of creating “a zone of monetary stability” in Europe, from the first pro-
posal for a common currency at the Hague summit in 1969 via the European Monetary System (1979) 
to the Euro can be interpreted as an attempt to overcome this contradiction (Notermans 2012).
9. Although entirely compatible with the EU’s level playing field principle and rules on state aid, the 
Eurozone finance ministers rejected a Greek proposal for the establishment of a development bank. 
See point 10.7 of the Greek reform proposals of April 1, 2015 (Government of Greece 2015).
10. Ironically, the EU Commission, in its report of January 29 1976 had argued against Greek EU 
membership, mainly on the ground of its backward economy. The Council of Ministers, however, 
decided to overrule the Commission for what essentially were geopolitical reasons.
11. Flash Eurobarometer 405, p. 8.
12. Though the IMF (2015: 13) argues that a partial default would allow an immediate return to inter-
national financial markets.
13. Tsipras would probably have been brought to heel earlier if the other Eurozone countries had not 
immediately rejected Wolfgang Schäuble’s proposal for a temporary Grexit.
14. President Hollande and chancellor Merkel’s much heralded last minute €35 billion investment 
program for Greece, however, was merely a reminder of the funds Greece was entitled to anyway 
over the next couple of years under the various cohesion programmes.
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